So favorable was his work that the State Department quietly commended him to his employers at the New York Times for his accuracy and fairness. 5 Bigart, on the other hand, judging from years of experience reporting wars, never had much good to say about either the war or the South Vietnamese Government. His last report from Saigon, indeed, predicted that the United States, because of South Vietnamese ineptitude and corruption, would shortly have little choice but to commit American troops to the conflict. 6 Westmoreland's statistic itself is questionable. Of the 110 U.S. citizens accredited to report the war from Saigon in January 1966, the only date where ready figures are available, 38 were below the age of thirty and 72 above it. Thirty-seven were above the age of forty-one and eight were fifty-one or older. Similar statistics prevailed among the 170 non-U.S. correspondents present in Saigon at the time. One hundred and thirteen ranged in age from thirty to seventy years old. Since the make-up of the corps of correspondents in Saigon changed almost every day as new reporters arrived and others departed, it is possible that the average age was at times twenty-nine. Yet, the statistic is, once again, probably more imaginary than real. In the case of the January 1966 group, the average was obviously somewhat higher.7 The average mean age for all correspondents who served in Vietnam whose records survive in Army files is, indeed, 35.83. 8 In the same way, the idea that the war appeared nightly in the nation's living rooms and that the experience could only have soured the public on continued American involvement in South Vietnam fails to stand up before hard scrutiny. The few studies of the subject that have occurred to date show that while television news set part of the agenda for what people thought about,9 the judgments that resulted were complex in origin and hardly the product of some vague sense of horror conveyed by television news. In one study, researchers Richard R. Lau, Thad A. Brown, and David 0. Sears found that the longstanding commitments and habits of a lifetime had a greater bearing on public opinion of the war than even ties of kinship. Examining the attitudes of Americans who had relatives serving in Vietnam, they found that the families of soldiers indeed paid more attention to the war than those who had few ties to it. The acceptance of official policy by those individuals, however, was more influenced by attitudes and preconceptions formed early in life-as expressed in political affiliations, degree of anticommunism, and sense of confidence in and support for the system of government that prevails in the United States-than by even their supposed concern for their loved ones. 10 Westmoreland's comment about the effect of Cronkite's word notwithstanding, evidence exists to support the contention that, rather than changing opinions within the viewing audience, television coverage of the war may have reinforced those that already existed. Northwestern University researcher Lawrence Lichty thus found during a 1968 survey of public opinion that 75 percent of those who favored the war at the time considered Cronkite and the other network anchoremen hawks while a majority of those who opposed it considered them doves."
The number of people actually watching television news at the time when it was supposedly influencing public opinion against the war is also open to question. The Columbia University Survey of Broadcast Journalism for 1972 notes that in 1968, of 56 million television households present in the United States, fewer than half, 25.3 million, watched the news on any evening. The ratio decreased in the years that followed, reaching 24.7 million in 1972.12 Whether those who watched actually absorbed anything is also a matter of conjecture. According to a study underwritten by the National Association The American public thus saw the feet but never the faces of its dead on the nightly news. The networks, meanwhile, cut film that showed too much violence rather than lose viewers to another channel. Even in the case of the famous Loan film, editors removed the last few seconds of footage to keep the public from seeing the final throes of the victim and the blood spurting from his head.'6 What the public saw, therefore, in the absence of faces and gore, was hardly the carnage that critics of the press have tended to allege. In fact, the action scenes from any episode of the popular television dramas "Gunsmoke" and "Kojak," carefully paced and filmed for effect, were probably more brutal than all but a few of the most explicit films from Vietnam.
None of that is to say that reporters always observe the niceties. On the contrary, as the nurse perceived, war correspondents, almost by the nature of their work, have tended historically to harden themselves to the painful realities going on about them. The famous war correspondent Richard Harding Davis provides an example. He dined luxuriously every evening at the beginning of World War I, after spending the day with the troops in the field reporting Germany's invasion of Belgium.
As in any profession, that a few of the Saigon correspondents were unethical also goes without saying. A CBS News report narrated by Don Webster in 1967 in which a U.S. Army enlisted man severed the ear from the body of a dead enemy soldier comes to mind. Although incidents of that sort indeed occurred in Vietnam, the episode was hardly the spontaneous atrocity Webster described. The reporter's cameraman, John Smith, had persuaded the soldier to perform the act, had furnished the knife, and had then photographed the scene. That Webster was not present at the filming was, perhaps, a partially extenuating circumstance, but the newsman should have checked his facts before delivering the report.'7 Any attempt to reason from incidents of that sort to the general depravity of the news media nevertheless succumb to the very temptation Taylor accused the press of indulging. They substitute the part for the whole. Unverifiable rumors persist to this day in official circles, for example, that a wellknown correspondent reported the Cambodian Incursion of 1970 while safely ensconced in his Saigon hotel room. That one newsman may have proved deficient in integrity, however, hardly diminishes the sacrifice of the twenty-five newsmen of varying temperaments, opinions, and degrees of professionalism who perished during the Incursion or shortly thereafter while observing events first-hand. 18 The suggestion lingers, in that light, that much of the animosity toward the press displayed by former officials and others originates as much from newsmen's failure to perform as those individuals wished as from any defect in their lifestyles or commitment to generally accepted standards of fairness. "We begged them to write about our situation and the desperate condition of our patients," the nurse said, her voice quaking with anger. "We lacked everything-sufficient medicine, modern equipment, enough doctors and nurses, even beds. But no articles ever appeared. The reporters were too busy promoting their careers by writing the popular stuff."
The nurse was nevertheless more than a little accurate in her portrayal of the newsmen's attitude. Public affairs officers in Saigon had tried almost from the beginning of the war to interest reporters in the sort of story she wanted told. A number had responded but few of the resulting essays ever appeared in print or on television in the United States because editors and producers had concluded early on that the American public was more interested in what was happening to American soldiers than in anything having to do with the South Vietnamese or their government. A scattering of articles on the subject thus appeared over the years, along with a number that criticized inadequate American efforts to assist the South Vietnamese people, but few reporters ever pursued the topic with much consistency. They knew the attempt would be a waste of time. ' In that case, as throughout the war, both military and civilian administrators required a free and unfettered press to communicate their views credibly to an American public and Congress that were often prone to believe the worst of officialdom. As the commander of U.S. naval forces in the Pacific, Admiral U. S. Grant Sharp told the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Earl G. Wheeler, in 1965, "We can get away with concealing mistakes from the press some of the time, but by no means all of the time." The lack of credibility that would result if a cover up came to light "could cause problems far more serious than result from the revelation of occasional mistakes. 30 The alternative was also hardly as bad as it seemed. Although the Saigon correspondents were sometimes abrasive, few were willing to risk access to their official sources by revealing information they had promised to withhold. Some sensitive facts did appear, yet the U.S. Military Assistance Command in Vietnam was never able to establish that the information had been of any value to the enemy. In many cases, reporters had pieced together information already on the public record. In others, the enemy had sources of his own that were far more reliable.
In 4. The nurse telephoned author in July of 1987. He was so taken with her comments that he lacked the presence of mind to take down her name and telephone number. He hopes that the reader will excuse his lack of historical methodology as a temporary lapse and accept the quotation as an honest, very personal testimony to the complexity of a highly emotional issue.
